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How do state-owned enterprises adapt: an historical and comparative exploration of CEO turnover decisions.

Ano de publicação: 2.018 Publicação:  Academy Of Management Proceedings, n.1, jul/2018. Paginação:   Autores: FERREIRA, Paul  et al. Tipo de Publicação: Artigo Autor Principal:   Outros Autores: FERREIRA, Paul  et al. Resumo: Agency theory generally describes state ownership as a liability, and predicts that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are, on average, less efficient and profitable than privately-owned firms (PFs). We propose executive leadership changes as an understudied source of variation in SOE performance. Blending the agency and CEO turnover literatures with insights from the managerial discretion perspective, we predict how organizations’ CEO turnover strategies reflect not only different types of ownership forms (i.e., SOEs and PFs), but also how these organizations channel pressures from different levels of market (economic downturn) and nonmarket (democratic regime) forces in their external environment. Using a longitudinal Brazilian dataset contrasting SOEs and PFs, results indicate that SOEs engage in more CEO turnover than PFs and that this effect reinforces under environmental conditions that further restrain SOEs’ ability to grant their CEOs with managerial discretion. We thus reveal a novel channel through which SOEs may underperform PFs.
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